The 27th UN Climate Conference, COP27, will take place at the end of 2022.

This year’s conference is due to take place in Egypt for the first time, and in the United Arab Emirates the following year. This is reason enough to take a closer look at climate policy in the West Asia and North Africa region—or the Middle East and North Africa, as it is still mostly referred to. Thus far, only a few studies on climate policy in this region have been produced. A general survey is made more difficult by the region’s heterogeneity: it includes oil-exporting countries with a high standard of living and above-average per capita greenhouse gas emissions, but also poor countries with slim resources and low emissions. An adequate discussion of climate change and international climate policy in the region must take this diversity into account, by examining different sub-regions and groups of states separately.

The region is already feeling the effects of global warming, and these will only continue to become more evident. However, predicting them precisely is difficult. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which compiles the current state of climate change research every few years, points out that there is insufficient data and a lack of research funding, for the African continent especially. The forecasts that can be made suggest that impacts will vary by sub-region. The whole area will become hotter, especially in the summer. Heat waves will be more frequent, posing a particular threat to the elderly and the ill. While wind speeds are likely to decrease in North Africa, in West Asia, conversely, there may be more sand and dust storms due to stronger winds. In the Mediterranean, reduced rainfall is highly likely. In the Sahara and parts of Western Asia, precipitation may increase, but mostly in the form of brief periods of heavy downpours, accompanied by the risk of severe flooding. Increased evaporation due to higher temperatures will make things drier overall. This, and the more marked fluctuation in precipitation, will significantly reduce the reliability of agriculture, which continues to be the main livelihood for many people in the region. Rising sea levels threaten numerous coastal towns with flooding. Areas used for agriculture are threatened with salination, which would render the land infertile. However, the observed developments are not solely due to climate change. There are other factors that need to be taken into account. For example, the subsidence and salination of the Nile Delta can also be ascribed to the construction of numerous dams, something that has been going on for more than 100 years. The increase in sandstorms in Iran is also due to the draining of marshes and the intensive agricultural use of water.

Climate policy has recently gained in importance in the region, and not only due to the palpable effects of global warming. Since the 2015 Paris Agreement, obligations to reduce emissions have been extended beyond the countries of the developed world. All countries must now submit climate plans with potential reductions and regularly report on their progress. Investment decisions and entry criteria for export markets like the European Union (EU) are also increasingly linked to climate policy. The countries of the region, which—with few exceptions—have not been actively involved in international climate policy discussions, have reacted to this challenge in a range of ways. Three broad groups can be distinguished, taking diverse climate policy positions. The first group tends to emphasize the fact of being vulnerable to the climate crisis. These countries, with their minimal emissions per capita, have barely contributed to the problem, and have few resources available that could be deployed to ameliorate its consequences. For this group, the focus is on adaptation and climate financing, whether for adaptation measures or, in the longer term, as compensation for damages. In the second group, the polluters, the opposite applies: these are countries that through oil and gas exports have themselves made considerable contributions to climate change. To this group belong countries like the Gulf states, which have become rich thanks to the export of fossil fuels, and which have high living standards as well as high per capita emissions. These countries have intermittently tried to obstruct international climate policy. In the meantime, a policy shift has taken place, and they are now trying to diversify their economies, with the help of climate policy measures, for the sake of greater economic stability. Other countries from this group also export oil and gas, but continue to have low standards of living, and on this basis argue that the use of such resources is necessary for their further socio-economic development. Finally, a few states have taken up the role of climate policy trailblazers and strive, despite their own low emissions, to put ambitious climate policies in place—Morocco falls into this group, for example. They also use this role to further their foreign policy, attempting to position themselves as locations for investment in green energy. Additionally, there are numerous countries currently unable to pursue a fully fledged climate policy due to war, civil war, or severe economic crises.

Conflicting interests in the region, including within countries and governments, at times make for contradictory climate policies. This is compounded by the considerable influence exerted by external powers. Most of the region’s states are former colonies, and postcolonial dependencies persist both economically and politically. Country-based climate policies are also often shaped by the priorities and interests of international donors. Military and security interests likewise play a significant role, as the region is considered geopolitically important. Finally, in Europe especially, the region is frequently discussed in connection with migration.

In contrast to other regions, to date there has been little activism explicitly addressing the climate crisis. Projects dealing with climate change tend to take place in government circles or in the context of development aid. However, many issues that play a role in the political debate—such as access to land or water—are clearly related to global warming but often framed in different terms. In recent years, too, regional social movements have increasingly been taking up the issue. Differing trends can be traced back to the extent to which the respective governments have tolerated or promoted these movements, and to the amount of available knowledge about climate change.

Understanding climate policy in the region requires recognizing the diversity and variety of starting points, and keeping these in mind. Making alliances with local progressive forces will require acknowledging the existence of different debate cultures; in some cases it will be necessary to transcend the concept of climate, in order to connect with political debates that are relevant to the climate crisis even though they are conducted with different keywords. This will avoid a reductionist approach to the causes of the existing problems and crises. Resource conflicts, wars, uprisings, and migration are all complex phenomena, usually involving the convergence of multiple causes. Solely or predominantly attributing such phenomena to global warming risks depoliticizing them and obfuscating political responsibilities. In terms of progressive climate policy, for most of the poorer states in the region the adaptation to local consequences of global warming plays a greater role than reducing emissions. The expansion of social welfare, systems of social support based on solidarity, and the rollback of neoliberalism can provide frameworks for adaptation that are more effective than technical solutions. The restructuring of existing trade relations, and of the financial and debt systems, are also important prerequisites for enabling any kind of meaningful climate action in the countries of the Global South. Separate from all of these aspects is the concrete question of how to deal with authoritarian regimes that represent their countries in the context of international climate policy. Especially where funding is concerned, social movements from the region have called attention to a vitally important problematic: how can support be designed in such a way that it reaches those affected, and does not prop up repressive apparatuses and authoritarian regimes? Nor is this issue limited to the region. Although particularly salient in the Middle East and North Africa, the same problem presents itself in many other parts of the world. Engaging with countries in the region, and developing proposals for progressive climate policies that are functional under these difficult conditions, can contribute to better ways of dealing with such contradictions and also generate approaches to solutions—not only within the region, but also beyond it.

In November 2022, the annual United Nations Climate Change Conference will be held in Egypt for the first time; in the following year, it will take place in the United Arab Emirates.

As it stands, in the coming years negotiations on how to deal with climate change will be taking place in a part of the world that, thus far, has barely come to the attention of international climate policy observers and activists: West Asia and North Africa, still mostly referred to as the Middle East and North Africa, or MENA. The region is not an easy one for climate campaigners. Most states are ruled by authoritarian regimes, and social movements that oppose governments are subject to harsh repression. In addition, many environmental policy debates are conducted using completely different terms than those common in Europe. Nor is classifying the region in terms of climate policy simple either, because it is made of up very different states: on the one hand, the rich oil exporters, and on the other hand, states that hardly contribute to climate change at all, and that due to poverty are ill-equipped to deal with its consequences.

This is not the only reason for the scarcity of studies or publications tackling climate policy in the region. In the media, security and geopolitical issues dominate the conversation about the Middle East and North Africa—migration and terrorism, crises and war—and this is also the case for research and politics. When the focus does get placed on the region’s societies, cultural topics get priority—religion first and foremost.

In the past few years, however, a change has been taking place: in academic research on the Middle East and North Africa, there is increasing interest in the question of how communities treat and shape their natural environment. At the same time, at an international level and in the development sector, the significance of environmental policy has grown since the 1990s. The severity of the effects of climate change has already become obvious: record temperatures, sand storms, heavy rains, and floods are more frequent, while rising sea levels threaten coastal cities and river deltas. The claim that a drought caused by climate change contributed to the outbreak of civil war in Syria was the subject of a serious albeit controversial discussion. However, a simple formula—things are getting hotter and drier—does not encompass the consequences of climate change in the Middle East and North Africa. Global warming is having a variety of effects in the region, depending on location and on who is impacted.

This is likewise valid for climate policy. With the 2015 Paris Agreement, the second binding international climate treaty, the focus of climate policy shifted. Unlike previous treaties, the aim is not only to reduce emissions from the developed world; all states worldwide are now obliged to structure their economies in a more environmentally friendly way. This presents a challenge for many states and stakeholders whose national economies are organized around the export and use of fossil fuels, and who have had to find, or still need to find, their role in this changed climate policy context. The present study aims to document this process, and thereby at least partly close the current gap in climate policy research on the Middle East and North Africa region.

The first question that presents itself is how the region should be defined. The Middle East and North Africa are to a large extent colonial constructs, as the term “Middle East” itself makes clear—the region is neither “middle” nor “east”, except from the perspective of Europe. Still, the term continues to be used as a way of examining the countries of North Africa and West Asia as a bloc. These countries do also share certain common features: the Arabic language, Islam as the dominant religion, a shared history as part of the Ottoman Empire and as European colonies up until independence in the 20th century. Despite their differing levels of prosperity, most of the states in the region share a similar economic structure and therefore face similar climate policy problems. There is no fixed definition for the Middle East and North Africa. Which states are included depends on the question being posed. In this study, the following countries are examined as part of the region: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.¹

These countries are totally diverse in terms of economy and standard of living—and as a result, also in terms of their contribution to climate change. The goal of this study is to do justice to this diversity, while still analysing regional climate policy in a comprehensive way. After an overview of the effects of climate change in the region (chapter 2), the countries will be placed into several groups, with particular common qualities and interests with respect to climate change (chapter 3). The analysis first focuses on the level of nation states, for these are the major actors in the UN climate negotiations; further sub-chapters are dedicated to the special regional challenges to climate policy, as well as to climate activism beyond the state. In the last section (chapter 4) the question will be raised as to which emancipatory approaches exist (and could be supported) in this context. How can climate policy in the region be discussed without falling into colonial or orientalist patterns? Which progressive forces or approaches can be discerned, and potentially supported?

The study should thus provide an overview of climate policy in the region for those who have hitherto engaged little with the Middle East and North Africa, as well as facilitating an insight into international climate policy for those who are researching the region—with the hope that the exchange between both groups becomes more intensive, and that treatments of climate change in the region take on a more differentiated form.

1 Turkey and Israel, which are also sometimes included, are outside the ambit of this study. In terms of climate policy requirements and their respective political and economic structures, these states are sharply distinguished from the others in the region. Turkey, already an OECD member when the Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted, has a special status in the UN climate negotiations; it belongs to the group of Annex I countries but was long exempt from emissions reduction obligations. Israel only became a member of the OECD in 2010, and hence is not formally an Annex I country. In both countries there are active environmental movements that exercise pressure on governments—also a relevant difference from the other states discussed here (see chapter 3).

Dealing With Uncertainties and Insufficient Data

What are the effects of climate change on a particular region? Apart from individual studies, the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provide an answer to this question. Thousands of scientists worldwide work together for the IPCC. In a multi-year cycle, they sift through all the current research on climate change, summarize it, and publish reports which often run to several thousand pages. The most recent of these appeared in three parts, between August 2021 and April 2022. The current state of research on the impacts of climate change on West Asia and North Africa should therefore be apparent from these reports.

However, this is neither unambiguous nor simple to determine. For one thing, the IPCC reports contain chapters on the regional effects of climate change—yet the Middle East and North Africa is not one of the regions defined by the IPCC. Their analysis takes place roughly by continent: North Africa is part of Africa, and West Asia of Asia. For the first time, the latest report includes a chapter on the Mediterranean. Detailed statements about how climate change is affecting specific places cannot be made on such a coarse scale.

Such statements also remain difficult to make even when the report goes into more detail about particular countries or areas within the region. Often, there is simply not enough data. For example, in order to ascertain temperature increases as compared to the long-term average, —and to deduce potential further increases—historical data are just as necessary as current measured values. For many countries in the Global South, there are no historical data available. There are also insufficient infrastructure and funding for the regular collection of weather and climate data. This lack is especially glaring in Africa. Although the continent is among the hardest hit by climate change, only 3.8 percent of global climate research funding is allocated for research there—and 78 percent of this amount goes to institutions in North America and Europe (IPCC 2022, chapter 9.1.5).

Such statements also remain difficult to make even when the report goes into more detail about particular countries or areas within the region. Often, there is simply not enough data. For example, in order to ascertain temperature increases as compared to the long-term average, —and to deduce potential further increases—historical data are just as necessary as current measured values. For many countries in the Global South, there are no historical data available. There are also insufficient infrastructure and funding for the regular collection of weather and climate data. This lack is especially glaring in Africa. Although the continent is among the hardest hit by climate change, only 3.8 percent of global climate research funding is allocated for research there—and 78 percent of this amount goes to institutions in North America and Europe (IPCC 2022, chapter 9.1.5).

Effects on the Region

The developments that can already be observed—and which will intensify in future—have wide-ranging impacts on the everyday world and the economy of the affected countries.

The higher temperatures in the summer and the increased frequency of heat waves are a serious danger, above all for older people and the ill, pregnant women, and children. This is especially the case for those populations with limited protection from the heat: those living in informal settlements in cities, for example, and with limited access to electricity and water. Heat waves place an additional burden on energy systems. In hot regions like North Africa and West Asia, the highest use of electricity occurs in summer due to the need for air conditioning and refrigeration. The precarious electrical grid in many countries of the region—e.g. in Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories—often collapses under the increased load. Higher temperatures can also lead to the swifter spread of certain diseases. In Egypt, for example, certain types of mosquitoes could multiply more rapidly in the irrigation canals and spread malaria and other diseases (Sowers 2013, p. 212).

More erratic rainfall and temperatures, and more severe drought, are making agriculture less reliable and can lead to more frequent crop failures. In 2021, for example, half of Egypt’s usual olive crop was lost because spring temperatures were too high for the sensitive flowers (Arafat 2021b); the unusually volatile temperatures led to even greater losses in mango crops (Arafat 2021a). The severe impacts climate change is having on agriculture in particular are hurting the region, since in many countries the majority of the workforce is employed in farming. According to one study, between 1991 and 2010 the economic output of the African continent was more than 13 percent below what it could have been in the absence of global warming (IPCC 2022, chapter 9.6).

Rising sea levels endanger coastal areas and cities in multiple ways: with the threat of floods, particularly during storms; with increased erosion; and with salination—if seawater increasingly mixes with groundwater, the latter can no longer be used for drinking or irrigation. Rising sea levels cannot be halted. Even if all emissions of greenhouse gases were to cease immediately, sea levels would long continue to rise, and it will take hundreds or thousands of years for them to descend again. Around a third of the region’s population lives in areas that are directly affected by rising sea levels. Along the coast of the Mediterranean and of the Indian Ocean there are numerous cities with a million or more inhabitants, such as Tripoli, Alexandria, and Beirut, as well as the newly established Gulf metropolises like Dubai and Abu Dhabi. For the Arabian Peninsula, rising temperatures are predicted to result in more wind and hence more frequent storms, which may threaten structures constructed in the water, such as Dubai’s sand islands; in the long term, these may only be maintainable at great expense and with permanent protective measures. The authors of the IPCC draw a gloomy picture for the future of many cities of the southern Mediterranean. The measures that would be necessary to protect these cities in the event of a sharper rise in sea levels are so extensive that hardly any country in the region would be capable of implementing them alone (IPCC 2022, Cross Chapter Paper 4, FAQ 2).

Causes and Adaptation—Climate Change in Context

The very example of rising sea levels also shows how it is impossible to understand climate change in isolation. The consequences of man-made climate change are intertwined with a plethora of political and economic decisions that can amplify or mitigate them. The specific impacts can only be understood in the context of specific circumstances. Three case studies from the region illustrate this point.

All of these examples show the close interweaving of the consequences of climate change with the overall direction of the economy, with political questions, and with everyday practices. This makes it in part more difficult to allocate definitive responsibilities. But it also shows paths towards more successful adaptation. Measures like rolling back neoliberal structures, promoting functioning social support systems and safeguards, and focusing on resilience—as well reflecting more fundamentally on the character of the economic and development systems—cannot avert the consequences of climate change, but they can significantly reduce their severity.

i. (Post-)Colonial Dependencies

Most of the states in the region are former colonies, and colonial dependencies shape their economic structures to this day. North African and West Asian states, with the exception of those with large oil reserves, are highly indebted, and this has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. They are, consequently, heavily dependent on external donors, especially organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF, as well as on development aid from Western countries. Through their programmes and attached conditions, these organizations strongly influence certain policy aspects in these countries. This also includes climate policy, which is predominantly financed by state and supranational actors from the Global North. For example, the German development aid agency GIZ funds renewable energy projects in the region, adaptation measures, and the establishment of climate monitoring systems. It also has an influence on political processes: for the countries in receipt of funds, it offers support in international climate negotiations, in drawing up national climate plans, and in drafting environmental legislation. For example, GIZ supported the drafting or amendment of renewable energy laws in Morocco (GIZ 2020) and Egypt (GIZ 2015). This can be a show of beneficial support and it can help to build expertise. However, it also calls into question the extent to which climate policy measures are actually supported by local actors. Climate plans or projects could sometimes be more an expression of the interests of donors than the result of political negotiation processes on the ground. In the two cases mentioned above, for example, central concerns of GIZ were to work towards liberalization of the electricity markets, to enable non-state actors to access the electricity market, and to relax existing price regulations. In the field of renewable energies in particular, a danger of perpetuating colonial relations remains: for example, since the end of the 1990s, the EU and some energy companies have been planning the construction of a Mediterranean ring that would connect the electricity grids of North Africa, the Middle East, and Europe—thereby creating the possibility of bringing North African “green energy” to Europe. The German government’s hydrogen strategy also relies on importing “green” hydrogen from the Global South, especially North and West Africa⁷ due to a lack of available landmass in Germany. For North African countries this may mean investment, but—if energy and resources will continue to be exported instead of being used for their own population and further development—it may also lead to a continuation of colonial patterns.

7 On the question of green hydrogen from North and West Africa, see the study Fair Green Hydrogen, https://www.rosalux.de/publikation/id/46412/fairer-wasserstoff-aus-afrika.

ii. Security and Geopolitics

The region has not been at peace since the Iraq war in early 2000s, closely followed by the uprisings and revolutions beginning in Tunisia in 2010 and then spilling over to most of the other countries. While in some countries protests against authoritarian rule and social inequality escalated into civil war, others are (once again) ruled by authoritarian regimes or military dictatorships. These promise stability, taking advantage of the fear of unrest and civil war both among their own population and in allied countries. The region is considered geostrategically important for various reasons. Firstly, its importance lies in its supply of fossil fuels—Saudi Arabia, a close ally of the USA, is considered a balancing factor on the world market due to its high production capacities, while Algeria, Egypt, and Qatar have the now highly coveted gas fields. Secondly, it holds important transport routes, such as the Suez Canal. The region is also important due to the fear of an escalation or expansion of terrorist activities, as well as the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Arab states. Various major and regional powers are vying for influence in the region, often in complicated and sometimes contradictory constellations, as in Syria or Libya, which further complicates the different participants’ scope for action, including in terms of climate policy.

Particularly in the USA and the EU, a reading also established itself early on according to which climate change is mainly viewed as a security problem. It is a “threat multiplier”, according to an influential 2013 report by a US think tank, and amplifies the interconnected effects of political, economic, religious, demographic, and ethnic causes of conflict (Werrell and Femia 2013). Commentators have linked the civil war in Syria with climate change from the beginning (Gleick 2014; Werrell et al. 2015): a drought lasting several years is said to have increased migration from the countryside to the cities, which then led to uprisings. According to Sternberg (2012), multi-year droughts in Asia and the resulting high world market price for wheat were a reason for the 2011 revolution in Egypt. However, authors who have long written about the region have pointed out that these explanations are often based on shortcuts and cannot be empirically proven: for example, there is no evidence of increased migration to the cities in the run-up to the Syrian revolution in 2011 (Selby et al. 2017). The government-set price of aish baladi, the subsidized bread in Egypt that is the food staple of most of the population, has not increased since 1989 (Barnes 2018). Journalist Francesca de Châtel, who specializes in water conflicts in the region, warned against depoliticizing the uprisings by blaming them on climate change (2014). The scholar Jessica Barnes also points out that a one-sided reduction of the reasons for the uprisings to climate change contributes to obscuring political responsibilities: «“While climate change is a major global concern, the rush to link climate change with recent upheavals in the Middle East, such as Egypt’s 2011 revolution, is both simplifying and depoliticizing. The link between climate, bread, and protest erases important social, material, and cultural nuances, distorts the allocation of responsibility, and ultimately, obscures more than it illuminates. ” (Barnes 2018)

Migration

Finally, the region’s geographical location as the European Union’s southern and south-eastern neighbour also presents particular challenges. Since the 1990s, the EU has been increasingly sealing itself off from its neighbours, and the political culture is to some extent characterized by the fear of mass migration from poorer countries to the south of the continent. The “security perspective” that often shapes discussions on climate change in the EU therefore primarily refers to migration. The assumption that the consequences of climate change in North African or Middle Eastern states will lead to increased migration to the EU still dominates discourses from both the left and the right. In fact, migration researchers repeatedly point out that migration is a complex phenomenon that involves many factors and cannot be reduced to a single cause. The IPCC also finds no evidence that the already clearly noticeable consequences of climate change are leading to increased migration to Europe. Instead, climate-related droughts or floods primarily cause migration movements to the immediate vicinity of the event. In recent years, several studies have suggested that migration could be a useful adaptation strategy, as it has the potential of mitigating the risks posed by climate change (IPCC 2022, chapter 7 Cross Chapter Box MIGRATE; chapter 9). However, this can only become a real possibility if it is not severely constrained and accompanied by such high risks as is currently the case in the EU. While there are social movements advocating for more opportunities to migrate, others have criticized the approach of seeing migration as an adaptation strategy: just as there is a right to migrate, they argue, there must also be a right to stay put, and it is therefore necessary to fight to ensure that no one has to leave their home due to climate change or its consequences.

8 https://zeitschrift-luxemburg.de/artikel/das-bewaffnete-rettungsboot/.

However, a broad climate movement, such as the movement developing in Europe and the USA since around 2019, or active and well-networked groups that demand climate justice at national and international levels, as in South Africa or many countries in Latin America, do not exist in the Middle East and North Africa. ⁹

This has partly to do with political and economic circumstances: where there is civil war, or the economic situation forces people to spend most of their effort on daily survival, there is little room for taking action on global problems like climate change. In repressive regimes, where any kind of political activity can lead to arrest, torture, and death, organising around climate issues is also impossible. However, the extent to which environmental and climate activism can be found in the region also depends on the definition of climate activism. Does it have to take the form that is common in the countries of the North? Do the actors involved have to see themselves as climate activists and refer to the global debate on climate change? Or can it also include all those forms of protest that are broadly connected to the big questions on climate change—even if this is not directly referenced?

Farmer and Barnes (2018, p. 381) point out that part of the difficulty in finding environmental movements in the region is that “environment” is a Western term that has no direct equivalent in Arabic. The direct translation al-bi’a is hardly used outside circles that work with international organizations or development aid institutions. Studies show that knowledge of climate change also varies greatly across the region. While in Morocco a large part of the population knows about climate change due to state programmes and organizations such as the teachers’ union providing environmental education, in countries like Egypt or Jordan less than half of the population is aware of the issue. Almost all the issues that have triggered social mobilization in the region in recent years have involved some environmental and climate-related component—but they are discussed in relation to other debates and using different terms. For example, air and water pollution is a major issue on which significant mobilizations have repeatedly emerged in recent years. However, these are predominantly discussed as health rather than environmental issues. Similarly, the distribution of land and water, the access to electricity and infrastructure, and to waste management and sanitation, all play an important role in public debates, especially in rural areas. Dams and other large-scale state projects for energy production frequently provoke mobilizations and protests. Trade unions play varying roles in the different states of the region: they can be largely controlled by the state, as in Egypt, or conversely be important social actors that also mobilize on issues of energy or social justice, as in Tunisia, where trade unions are active around labour conditions and pollution from phosphate mining, and advocate for energy justice. In this case, environmental issues are often discussed in relation to workers’ rights.

Sowers (2017) distinguishes three forms of political activism on environmental issues: first, there are professional environmental NGOs and networks dominated by experts, scientists and technocrats, which often emerge around international donors and adopt their discourses, i.e. by using concepts such as climate change and the environment. However, they have little support from or contact with the wider population, and their scope for action is often limited to “non-political” activities in the context of authoritarian regimes. Secondly, small-scale local action on specific demands can be observed around issues such as land access, redistribution of water, or protection from heavy pollution. The affected communities use legal or political means, demonstrations, and occupations to persuade state actors to make limited concessions in a specific case. Thirdly, there are broad mobilizations supported by a significant proportion of the population, hamla in Arabic, in which different active groups network regionally, build a temporary organizational structure, and strategically coordinate their activities. Such mobilizations—on environmental or other issues—can temporarily have a strong political impact and therefore force a short-term concession from the state. However, as soon as their strength weakens, they are usually subject to repression and the concessions often turn out to be empty promises.

As already outlined in Chapter 3.b, the first form is dominant across many countries of the region: expert networks of NGOs, scientists, and committed employees of state authorities who work together with international donors and organizations. Despite these countries being heavily impacted by climate change, the work in the region tends to be focused on climate protection and rarely on adaptation. This is not unrelated to the fact that, for a long time, international funding was predominantly available for climate protection projects (Sowers 2013).

Local mobilizations that refer to climate issues are found in countries where this is tolerated or even funded by the state. For example, as part of Morocco’s liberalization processes starting in the 2000s, the establishment of civil society organisations in the environmental field was promoted. This was especially the case with the widespread educational drive in the leadup to the climate conference in Marrakech in 2016, so that even groups primarily working on other issues—such as human rights—became more involved with climate issues, since they expected less repression and fewer restrictions in this area. Across the region, there are local initiatives, groups, and small cooperatives working for agroecology, for the protection and sustainable use of resources, and against pollution, and often also for women’s rights, the preservation of traditional knowledge and practices, or other forms of economic organization (see Houdaïfa et al. 2021 for an overview of Morocco). Conversely, in most countries of the region, any questioning of large state infrastructure and development projects—land reclamation projects, dams, shipping canals, or new megacities—or oil and gas development, which account for significant portions of state revenue, is viewed very critically by the state, stopped, or met with repression. This was the case of Algerian protests against fracking projects that threaten to pollute groundwater (Belakhdar 2020), for example.

9 Strong social movements advocating for environmental and climate concerns exist in Turkey and Israel, two countries that, as explained in chapter 1, are not counted within the ambit of this study.

10 See https://www.rosalux.de/news/id/39023/beschaeftigung-im-bergbausektor.

Recognize the diversity of the region

The region of the Middle East and North Africa is, as described above, a colonial construct. The region has a number of common features, but at the same time it comprises very different states: from poor countries with very low emissions to the states with large oil reserves, which produce some of the highest per capita emissions in the world. If climate policy is to be analysed or discussed at a regional level, it is important not to see the Middle East and North Africa as a uniform bloc with the same interests, but to recognize and engage with this diversity. This diversity is relevant not only between the different states, but also to the make-up of individual states: as is the case in all countries, these are diverse societies with different groups that are affected differently by climate change and which differ in their interests.

2. Looking beyond state and climate policy—progressive forces within society

Progressive climate policy in the region must confront the reality that most states here are ruled by authoritarian regimes or military dictatorships. In the United Nations, these governments advocate for the legitimate interests of the Global South. However, they are often not democratically elected. As social movements from Egypt, for example, pointed out in the run-up to the climate conference, they do not necessarily represent the interests of a majority of the population, and especially not those of the groups most vulnerable to climate change or committed to progressive politics; conversely, such groups are often subject to severe repression . 11 For the call by Egyptian activists ahead of COP27, see https://egyptsolidarityinitiative.org/COP27message/. At the same time, NGOs working on climate change in the region are often technologically oriented organizations of experts. Here it is worth looking beyond the term climate change: whether it be agriculture and land rights, access to water, energy justice, or working conditions in the extractivist energy sector—many political debates in the region are directly related to climate change and adaptation. However, the discussions are conducted using different terms.

11 For the call by Egyptian activists ahead of COP27, see https://egyptsolidarityinitiative.org/COP27message/.

Not all problems should be blamed on climate change

Mike Hulme (2011) was quick to warn against so-called “climate reductionism”, a truncated climate debate, “a way of seeing the world where the future of environment and society is seen in terms of climate alone”. It may be valid to highlight the impacts of climate change, but overemphasis risks depoliticization. If everything is blamed solely on climate change, those responsible for and profiting from numerous decisions with problematic impacts will no longer be called out. A detailed analysis shows that almost all the problems that climate change is causing and will cause are very complex and have multiple causes (Chapter 2). Acknowledging this complexity is necessary in order not to forget other problematic developments—such as the devastating consequences of industrial agriculture or large dams. It also helps to identify opportunities for action at the regional and local level that can mitigate the impacts of climate change.

4. Social welfare systems as an adaptation measure

The example of the Middle East and North Africa shows that the effects of climate change are closely intertwined with social developments. The neoliberal reforms in the region prevalent since the 1980s have contributed to large parts of the population now being much more vulnerable to the consequences of climate change. Conversely, social reforms—equitable land distribution, access to health care, government support programmes, and greater social justice—can be very efficient adaptation measures. Under certain conditions, the same can apply to migration, although here it is equally important to demand the right to freedom of movement as well as the right to stay. Looking beyond technological solutions and advocating for social forms of adaptation is especially important in a region with great social inequalities and widespread poverty.

5. Responsibility of the North—debt reduction and moving towards a fairer economic system

The issue of loss and damage—i.e., how to deal with climate-related damage and loss—has become a crucial issue in international climate negotiations over the last few years. While the countries of the Global South are increasingly demanding that the issue become an inextricable part of climate negotiations, the industrialized countries continue to vehemently oppose it. They fear that recognizing this demand could mean their being forced in future to pay for the damage caused in other parts of the world by their decades or centuries of oil and gas use. While it is undeniably important to support the establishment of loss and damage policies, and to demand that the North take responsibility for the damage done in the South, two points need to be considered. One concerns the question posed by the Egyptian author Hamilton in the run-up to the climate conference: how can such payments—as reparations or otherwise—be designed so that they do not prop up authoritarian state power? And who is going to ensure this, when the ones doing the negotiating on behalf of the Global South tend to be authoritarian state powers, “whose short-term interests are even more graspingly fragile than those of oil executives” (Hamilton 2022)? ?

The other central point is the sustainability of such payments. The experience of climate financing so far shows that a large proportion of the payments is made up of loans that lead to the already over-indebted countries of the South falling further into debt, thus further reducing their capacity to act. More payments of this kind, under the given global economic conditions, will eventually fizzle out and flow back to the Global North or to other donors as debt repayments. While demanding far-reaching support for the most vulnerable countries, including financial support, it is also necessary to advocate for new and different conditions—far-reaching changes to the economic system and the terms of trade—that make it possible for such payments to be effective in the first place.

6. Less climate protection, more adaptation

Finally, the example of the Middle East shows that international politics has a strong influence on how climate policy is implemented in countries of the Global South, and that the priorities set on the international level have a direct impact on individual projects in these countries. This makes it all the more important to strengthen the shift in international climate policy that has begun in recent years, and which, after decades of being primarily concerned with climate protection, has recently begun to focus on adaptation as well. While ambitious climate protection goals remain important—more important than ever, given the current growth in greenhouse gas emissions—these are primarily a matter for the Global North. For many countries in the Global South, adaptation is crucial. The issue of adaptation also offers a much wider range of opportunities for action, including low-threshold and non-technical actions. When action is taken directly, with the affected communities, opportunities for participation and co-creation also emerge.